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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1940-1945.
JAMES M. OGDEN*
The decisions of the Indiana Supreme and Appellate
courts relating to negotiable instruments are briefly noted in
the order of their decision. The few relevant statutes are set
forth following the discussion of the cases.
INDIANA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
Hardiman v. Hotlingsworth, 216 Ind. 631, 25 N.E. (2d)
640 (1940). The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict
in favor of the maker of a promissory note on the ground
that it was an accommodation note to he used as collateral,
and that the debt for which the note was pledged was paid
by the payee of the collateral note.
First National Bank of Goodland v. Pothuisje et al., 217
Ind. 1, 25 N.E. (2d) 436, 130 A.L.R. 1288 (1940).
Where a husband and wife were liable jointly on a note exe-
cuted by them, the fact that they had been adjudicated as
bankrupts, the husband not having been discharged, did not
prevent recovery of a joint judgment nor the enforcement of
the judgment against their property held by entireties.
In re Liquidation of Bourbon Banking Company, Bour-
bon, Indiana. First State, Bank of Bourbon v. Binkley et al.,
218 Ind. 96, 31 N.E. (2d) 52 (1940). A promissory note im-
ports consideration.
Where a note of a liquidating bank to another bank that
had assumed the assets and liabilities of the liquidating bank
was given for balance due on notes assigned by the liquidating
bank, such note imports consideration.
Paulausky et al. v. Polish Roman Catholic Union of
America et al., 219 Ind. 441, 39 N.E. (2d) 440 (1942). The
alteration of a mortgage note, executed in Illinois, with cog-
novit provision where such provision was valid, by the strik-
ing out of the cognovit provision, was not fraudulent, not-
withstanding that cognovit provision could not be exercised
in Indiana; where the provision was struck out openly pur-
suant to custom in the office of the general counsel of the
holder of the note, preparatory to sending note and mortgage
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to Indiana for enforcement, such note was enforceable in In-
diana if cognovit provision was not relied on.
Ryan, Admnistrator v. Smeltzer, 220 Ind. 60, 41 N.E.
(2d) 138 (1942). Promissory notes given for the unpaid
balance due upon former promissory notes are supported by
a sufficient and lawful consideration.
First National Bank of Crown Point, Indiana, A Corpora-
tion, v. St. John" Evangelical Church, A Corporation, 220 Ind.
72, 41 N.E. (2d) 197 (1942). The release of an individual's
accommodation note does not discharge the principal for whom
the note was executed.
Wabash Valley Trust Company v. Fisher, 220 Ind. 133,
41 N. E. (2d) 352, 142 A. L. R. 486 (1942). The execution
of a promissory note is not in issue in the absence of a plea
of non est factum.
Where a note was delivered to an agent for a certain
purpose and the agent violates an instruction of the owner
in transferring the note to a holder in due course for another
purpose in violation of instruction, the holder is entitled to
recover on the promissory note in the absence of a plea of
non est factum.
Kelley, Glover & Vale, Inc., et al. v. Heitman, 220 Ind.
625, 44 N. E. (2d) 981 (1942). Money consideration is not
essential for a promissory note. Benefit or detriment is suf-
ficient.
Complete failure and partial failure of consideration are
distinguishable.
Fardy et al. v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N. E. (2d)
315, 966 (1943). Appellant says the sale in question was a
valid public sale under Massachusetts law of which we must
take judicial notice. There was no such issue presented by
the pleadings. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act (Burns R. S. 2-4801 to 2-4807) dispenses with proof
but not pleading.
Section 4 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Acts requires that one asking that judicial notice be taken
of foreign law must give reasonable notice to the adverse
parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.
Hammond Pure Ice & Coal Company v. Heitman, 221
Ind. 352, 47 N. E. (2d) 309, 145 A. L. R. 997 (1943). The
pledgee of a negotiable note does not have such an interest
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therein that the maker of such note may set off against it
a debt which he holds against the pledgee.
"While it is true that the pledgee of a negotiable instru-
ment, may, on default thereon, sue on such pledged instru-
ment in his own name and may also accept payment of such
instrument according to its tenor and thereby discharge
the instrument, the pledgee is not the full owner of the in-
strument, for the application of the proceeds is subject to
the rights of the pledgor."
"The plegee actually has only a lien on such an instru-
ment to secure the payment of the principal debt. As against
the pledgor any unauthorized disposition of the pledged in-
strument by the pledgee would constitute a conversion there-
of. The pledgee is not authorized to accept payment be-
fore maturity of a pledge note which is payable on a day
certain; he is not authorized to exchange such a pledged
instrument for any other security; nor is he authorized to
accept in payment and discharge of such a pledged note any-
thing other than the full amount of the cash due thereon."
McGuire v. Indianapolis Broadcasting, Inc., et al. -
Ind. 61 N. E. (2d) 642 (1945). Action on a prom-
issory note in the sum of $15,000.00. To this action a plea
of "non est factum" was filed. Judgment for defendant.
The rule is that where the execution of a note or other
similar instrument in writing sued on is denied under oath,
and no evidence of the authenticity of such note or other
instrument is given, it cannot be read to the jury, but where
evidence addressed to the court is adduced, making out a
prima facie case of authenticity of such note or other in-
strument, or reasonably tending, even slightly, to prove the
formal execution of it, such evidence is sufficient to entitle
such note or other instrument to go to the jury.
Where the execution of a written instrument is denied
under oath, the party relying on the instrument has the bur-
den of proof on that issue throughout the trial.
And if on considering the evidence on the issue of "non
est factum" it cannot be said that the evidence is such that
it compels but one conclusion, which conclusion is contrary
to the decision of the lower court, the case should be af-
firmed.
McGuire v. Indianapolis Broadcasting, Inc., et al.
Ind. -, 61 N. E. (2d) 642 (1945). Judgment was af-
19461
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firmed, as the evidence on the issue of "non est factum" was
not such as to force a conclusion, different from that reached
by the trial court.
Spahr v. P & H Supply Co., - Ind. - , 63 N. E.
(2d) 425 (1945). A note executed in Ohio by an Ohio resi-
dent and delivered in Ohio to an agent of an Indiana cor-
porate payee, for value presumably given in Ohio since record
was silent as to place where value was given for the note,
must be deemed executed in Ohio and subject to Ohio law
though payable in Indiana, and hence Ohio judgment taken
pursuant to a cognovit provision in the note must be given
full faith and credit in Indiana.
W H. Barber Co. v. Hughes et al., - Ind. - , 63
N. E. (2d) 417 (1945). Where a member of an Indiana
partnership, which was indebted to an Illinois creditor on an
open account which arose mainly out of Illinois transactions,
agreed in Illinois to settle the account by paying part in cash
and the balance in a cognovit note, and subsequently in In-
diana both partners signed a cognovit note and mailed it to
the Illinois creditor in Illinois, where creditor accepted the
note and applied it to the satisfaction of the balance, all the
parties did not intend that the note should take effect until
the old obligation was discharged, and consequently the note
must be deemed to have been executed in Illinois, and the
validity of the note and its cognovit clause must be determined
by the Illinois law.
Consequently as the note was executed in Illinois where
such note is valid, the Indiana provision could have no extra-
territorial effect, where judgment was taken on the note in
Illinois as full faith and credit must be given to the Illinois
law.
We quote from the opinion of Chief Justice Richman who
delivered the opinion in the case.
"Looking for the contact points in the present case, we
observe first that the parties were at all times engaged in
purely business transactions. They transacted this business
almost exclusively in Illinois. The accumulated indebtedness
"on September 30, 1940, arose solely from Illinois transactions.
The place of their conferences to arrive at a settlement'was in
Illinois. The note was payable m Illinois. * * * It was valid
in that state and was there to be performed. It was actually
intended that Illinois law control, as expressly found by the
court. On the other hand the only contact points with Indiana
were the residence of the debtors, their signing of the note in
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Indiana and their placing it in the mail in Indiana. Consider-
ing all these circumstances it is impossible to escape the con-
clusions that the transaction centered in the State of Illinois
and that its law should be applied to the note and the judg-
ment taken thereon in the Municipal Court of Chicago."
INDIANA APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
Interstate Motor Freight System v. Gasoline Equipment
Co., Inc., 107 Ind. App. 494, 24 N. E. (2d) 418 (1940). In
an action on a promissory note providing for attorney's fees
where the amount of the attorney's fees is not fixed in the
note, the amount of such fees must be established by proper
evidence; and, when the attorneys are actually present in
court seeking to collect on the note so providing, it is not
incumbent on the holder of such note to prove the actual em-
ployment of counsel.
Vincennes Savings and Loan Assoczation of Vincennes
v. Robinson et al., 107 Ind. App. 558, 23 N. E. (2d) 431
(4939). A plea of non est factum is not in effect a plea of
forgery. The former plea alleges in effect simply a denial of
the execution of a written instrument. The latter plea al-
leges in effect such a denial and alleges further in effect
a fraudulent execution of the written instrument. Evidence
of fraud alone is not admissible to prove a defense of non
est factoum.
George et al. v. Massey Harris Company, 109 Ind. App.
305, 34 N. E. (2d) 956 (1941). The holder of a promissory
note may sue the whole or any number of the parties liable
to such holder. Section 19-1915, Burns' 1933.
The statute (Section 2-1009, Burns' 1933)) prohibits
the reversal of a judgment for any error committed in sus-
taining or overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of causes
of action.
Satterblom et al. v. Wasson et al., 111 Ind. App. 377, 41
N. E. (2d) 674 (1942). The party alleging that consideration
of a note is illegal or that there was no consideration thereof
has the burden of proof to establish such fact.
Erwin v. Erwin et al, 111 Ind. App. 448, 41 N. E. (2d)
644 (1942). The Statute of Limitations does not begin to
run against the ordinary certificate of deposit, payable on
the return of the certificate properly endorsed, prior to the
tune when payment is demanded.
Blume v. Kruckberg, Executor, 112 Ind. App. 390, 44
19461 443
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N. E. (2d) 1010 (1942). A note was executed by a child to
a parent, to be held by such parent as evidence of an advance-
ment to such child.
The note is without consideration, and the above facts
may be shown as a defense to an action on such note.
Franklin Nat. Bank v. Kerlin et al., 112 Ind. App. 641,
45 N. E. (2d) 368 (1942). Marginal figures on the face of
a note are not part of it, and where the body of the note is
in writing and is clear and unambiguous, the written body
of the note controls, and the obligation of the note is not
affected by a change made in the marginal figures.
Such a change in the marginal figures, where the words
written on the face of the note remain unchanged, is not a
material alteration.
Gradeless et al. v. Gradeless, Admnistrator, 114 Ind.
App. 10, 49 N. E. (2d) 398 (1943). tWhere a defendant in
an action on notes failed to plead in abatement the noncom-
pliance with the Intangible Tax Act but pleaded the matter
in bar, such defendant thereby waived his right to raise
such question, since such matters go to abatement of the
action and not to the defense.
Nardine v. Kraft Cheese Company, 114 Ind. App. 399,
52 N. E. (2d) 634 (1944). When the holder of a check has
it certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the drawer is
discharged and the debt becomes that of the bank.
So, when tendered in full payment of a clamm which was
unliquidated or concerning which a bona fide dispute existed,
the acceptance of the check discharges the debt.
Simpson et al. v. Fuller, 114 Ind. App. 583, 51 N. E.
(2d) 870 (1943). The inclusion of a cognovit clause in a
conditional sale contract does not invalidate the contract
where the clause is separable without affecting the remainder
of the contract, and where sellers did not attempt to act
under the clause but filed their complaint in due form and
process issued thereon. (Burns R.S. Sections 2-2904, 2-2906).
The statute defining a cognovit note and making the
execution, procurement and attempt to enforce such a note
as a misdemeanor is penal in nature and must be strictly
construed.
Snyder v. Heinrcks, - Ind. App. -, 55 N. E. (2d)
332 (4944). Where there was nothing in a complaint to
recover on a promissory note to indicate that plaintiff was
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engaged in the business of making small loans, failure to
allege possession of a license under Small Loan Act (Burns'
Ann. St. Sections 18-3001 to 18-3004) was not fatal.
And under a statute (Burns' Ann. St. Section 19-2004)
pertaining to usury, usurious interest called for by the terms
of a note sued upon does not prevent collection of the prin-
cipal amount thereon.
LEGISLATION
Ind. Act 1941, c. 43, P. 127. Good Friday has been made
a legal holiday in the state of Indiana for all purposes. This
necessarily makes such day a legal holiday as to commercial
paper or negotiable instruments.
Indt. Acts 1941, c. 53, p. 148. Transactions on legal holi-
days, except on Sundays, have been made valid generally
throughout Indiana by legislative action.
The act also provides: "All checks received by any bank
or trust company on Saturday may be presented for payment
on the next following business day, and all checks presented
to any bank or trust company on Saturday and dishonored,
may be protested and notice of protest thereof given or de-
posited in the post office on the next following business day."
Id. Acts 1943, c. 63, p. 161. Amendment to the intangible
Stamp Act (Burns R.S. 64-930) effective February 25, 1943,
by the addition of the following proviso: "Provided: That
a valid judgment may be rendered in any action on any such
intangible, if at the trial of said action it is shown that all
such taxes and penalties are then fully paid."
1946]

